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Executive Summary

1. Introduction

The implementation of sector management
in New England’s groundfish fishery sparked
dramatic changes in every aspect of the industry,
forcing an unprecedented level of innovation
and adjustment. The switch from the effort
controls of days-at-sea to the output controls
of sector allocation, prompted primarily by
federal mandates, changed everything from
a fisherman’s pre-trip planning to business
arrangements that get fish from the vessel to the
table. Some fishermen are leaving the fishery,
unable to compete in an era of tight catch limits,
rising operational costs, and a redistribution
of fishing privileges. Others are finding that
the greater flexibility that sector management
affords, with the option to lease additional
allocation, and improved market conditions
offer advantages over the days-at-sea system.
The change to sectors sparked debates about
the size and composition of the fleet, the role of
private markets in establishing access to a public
resource, and the adequacy of assessment science
to set catch limits suitable to the new system.
These debates are essential and may well lead to
modifications in the management process.

On May 1, 2010, New England’s groundfish fleet
underwent a seismic shift. That date marked
the transition from days-at-sea limits to sector
management—an output control regulatory system
that allocates a portion of the total annual harvest
of cod, haddock, pollock, flounder, and other
bottom-dwelling species to harvesting cooperatives
called sectors. The switch from input controls to
output controls mandated changes in every aspect
of the industry; it requires new data collecting and
reporting systems, monitoring protocols, fiscal and
legal bonds among fishermen, and fishing strategies.
Adapting to these changes has taxed the fleet’s
ingenuity and resources. Fishermen who are able
to invest and innovate will likely succeed under
sectors while those who lack the resources needed
to operate under the system will find it increasingly
difficult to compete.

This paper describes the key elements of
sector management and outlines the extent
and scale of the change it heralds. After just
two years of operating under sectors, the
region’s fishing industry, fisheries managers,
and nonprofit community have responded with
rapid innovation. Examples abound of that new
thinking. Meanwhile, innovation also faces
barriers. Finally, the region’s fishing communities
could explore new avenues for maximizing
the benefits of the sector system. Adaptation
and innovation are central themes, recognizing
that sector management introduced huge new
challenges while opening new opportunities for
the region’s fishing communities.

Sector management introduces a market-based
approach to the fishery, dividing the total allowable
catch for each stock into allocations that can be
traded among the sectors. The new system creates
an internal market for fishing privileges (internal
to the sector system since sector membership is
restricted to those with a limited access groundfish
permit). To augment their initial allocation, sectors
and their members can lease or trade allocation
from other sector fishermen. Ideally, this allows
them to build a portfolio that balances target and
constraining stocks.
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Constraining stocks
Fishermen operating in sectors have an initial allocation
of up to 16 stocks. The amount they have of each
stock depends on two factors. The first is the catch
history of that stock associated with their limited access
multispecies permit, based on the percentage that
their landings represented for a given stock during the
determining period (1996 to 2006). The second is total
allowable catch for the stock1 set by the New England
Fishery Management Council based on advice from
the Science and Statistical Committee. Multiplying the
catch percentage by the total allowable catch yields the
amount of fish a vessel brings to a sector, also known as
its potential sector contribution.
Figure 1. Percent of sectors’ annual catch entitlement caught
(landed and discarded) in fishing year 2011–May, 2011 through
April, 2012. source: NMFS

2. Setting the Stage
The reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens
Act in 2006 (signed into law in 2007) set the
stage for sector management by revising key
elements of federal fisheries law. Specifically,
the Act mandated strict rebuilding schedules
for vulnerable stocks to be implemented
through setting annual catch limits that are
enforced through accountability measures.
Regional science and statistical committees set
these catch limits based on the best available
science informing stock size and resiliency.
Accountability measures are designed to ensure
that annual harvests stay within those catch
limits and impose additional restrictions if those
limits are exceeded.
The New England Fishery Management
Council (Council), the body responsible for
setting most federal fishery regulations in the
Northeast, decided that the days-at-sea system
was too unwieldy, especially for incorporating
accountability measures. The need to set daysat-sea limits based on the most vulnerable
stocks would likely constrain the harvest of
abundant stocks. To make days-at-sea work
with accountability measures, NOAA’s National

In any given year, a vessel could end up with a high
allocation of a stock it rarely caught if the catch limit for
that stock dramatically increased. Conversely, a vessel
may have been dependent on a specific stock, yielding a
high catch percentage, but end up with a low allocation
if the total allowable catch is small. The result can create
imbalances in allocation relative to a vessel’s historical
catch compositions. Stocks with low allocations can
constrain the ability of a vessel to harvest stocks for which
they have ample allocation. This dynamic drives many of
the decisions fishermen now must make about the gear
they use, areas they fish, when they fish, and how much
additional allocation to purchase or lease.
Fishermen sometimes refer to constraining stocks as
“choke species”. They vary somewhat from sector to
sector, but can be identified on a fleet-wide basis from
catch data that NOAA reports. Figure 1 shows the
percentage of their annual catch entitlement that sector
vessels harvested from May 1, 2011 to April 30, 2012.
Constraining stocks are those with bars at or close to
100%. Generally, low harvest levels represent stocks that
being constrained by the penalties for overharvesting
choke species.
1 Some sectors also withhold a small reserve to ensure fishermen do
not exceed their allocation.
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Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) would have
had to make adjustments to those limits as the
fishing season progressed, likely spurring a race
to fish - the tendency to maximize harvest before
additional restrictions come into place.
Thus, the Council sought another regulatory
system that would comply with the tight
deadlines and rebuilding requirements of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act and establish more
forward-facing and predictable accountability
measures. Sector management offered such
a solution2. The Council avoided potential
regulatory delays by making the system voluntary
and allocating stocks to sectors rather than
individuals. Had the system been mandatory
and/or created individual quotas, it might have
triggered the need for a region-wide referendum,
which could not have been completed in time to
meet federally mandated deadlines. The Council
implemented sector management through
Amendment 16 to the Northeast Multispecies
Fisheries Management Plan.

3. Key Design Elements:
How do sectors work?
There are 16 groundfish sectors with actively
fishing members. An additional three sectors have
no active members—instead, they lease out their
entire allocation.

How a sector is formed
Any group of three or more federal groundfish
permit holders can apply to NMFS to form a
sector. After notifying NMFS of their intentions
a year in advance, they must draw up by-laws,
appoint a board and officers, and incorporate.
Most sectors form as 501(c)(5) organizations, a
non-profit designation for trade organizations.

2 Fishermen based in Chatham, MA, formed two sectors in 2003 and 2004
under Amendment 13 to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management
Plan. They were granted an allocation of Georges Bank cod to target
with hook gear and gillnets. These sectors formed the model for the wider
implementation of the concept under Amendment 16.
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Common Pool
Fishermen are given the choice to join a sector or remain
under the old days-at-sea system. Vessels choosing
to remain under days-at-sea make up what is known
as the Common Pool. This group of vessels shares an
allocation of stocks, which is essentially the amount of
the commercial total allowable catch left over once the
sector allocations have been calculated. The majority of
active vessels, accounting for approximately 98% of the
overall allocation, are enrolled in sectors. For the most
part, vessels choose the Common Pool because their
owners feel they can harvest more fish under days-at-sea
than if they join a sector. In order to ensure that Common
Pool vessels stay within their collective allocation, NMFS
sets trip limits for the most vulnerable species and
drastically limits the days-at-sea available to vessels. In
addition, NMFS can make changes to both trip limits
and days-at-sea any time during the season, meeting
the accountability measure requirements of Magnuson.
These in-season adjustments create significant
uncertainty for common pool vessels. Beginning in 2012,
NMFS will manage the Common Pool’s allocation under
a trimester system that spreads the annual harvest into
four-month periods to ensure the harvest lasts the entire
year rather than fished heavily at the start.

Meanwhile, they can recruit members and draft
an operations plan that includes harvesting
rules, infraction measures, a monitoring plan,
and any requests to be exempted from specific
regulations. All sectors are exempted from certain
regulations, such as days-at-sea, daily, and trip
limits. NMFS then reviews these documents
and may approve the sector for operation,
often pending modifications in response to
comments. All of this must happen in time for
NMFS to incorporate that sector’s plans into their
environmental assessment for the coming fishing
year, which takes several months to prepare and
several more months to go through the federal
rulemaking process. (Sectors’ operations plans
are public and available at http://www.nero.noaa.
gov/sfd/SectorManagers.html under the “Other
Resources” tab.)
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Joint and several liability
Self-enforcement is integral to sector management
—all members are equally responsible for
ensuring their sector does not exceed their
annual limits. Indeed, federal regulations require
members to be jointly and severally liable to
each other. That provision, along with logistical
concerns, has meant that most sectors formed
along social or cultural lines because sector
members need to trust each other. Thus, most
sectors are geographically based, sometimes
further divided by gear type or cultural ties.
Another factor that influences sector membership
is affiliation with an industry group. For example,
most members of the Associated Fisheries of
Maine, a leading industry group, joined the large
Sustainable Harvest Sector while members of the
Northeast Seafood Coalition likely joined one of
the 12 sectors that NSC established3. Over time,
sectors might realign themselves or new ones
might form to reflect marketing strategies or to
garner a more targeted allocation.

Annual Allocations
Each sector begins the fishing year with an
allocation of 16 different groundfish stocks. The
management plan includes another five stocks,
four of which are so scarce that sectors receive no
allocation for them and a fifth, halibut, has a one
fish per trip limit. Sector members decide how they
will collectively harvest that allocation and codify
that arrangement in their harvesting rules. Most
sectors divide their allocation among their members
according to catch history, essentially treating it as
individual quotas. Some sectors have begun to pool
constraining stocks as insurance to guard against
over-harvesting that stock, which would stop all
sector activity until they were able to buy or trade
quota for that stock from another sector. Most
sectors have members who are actively fishing and

3 These sectors now fall under an umbrella organization, the Northeast
Sector Services Network.

Catch History and Allocation:
Who Got What?
At the heart of the sector system lies the distribution
of fish among the sectors. Amendment 16 stipulates
that fish get divided based on the collective catch of
each sectors’ members from 1996 to 20064. Thus, if a
vessel accounted for 0.2% of Gulf of Maine cod over
that period, then it would bring 0.2% of the annual
total allowable catch for Gulf of Maine cod to their
sector. While the Council discussed other alternatives, it
ultimately decided that this catch history approach best
represented a vessel’s long-term dependency on the
resource. However, it does not account for changes in a
vessel’s business operations, the movement of permits
from one part of the region to another, or the differential
impact that effort controls had on different ports. Not
foreseeing the dramatic change in management, some
fishermen invested in permits with a high number of
days-at-sea but poor catch history—those permits
quickly lost their value. In this way, an individual’s catch
history may not always reflect historic participation in the
groundfish fishery.
Key to the success of sector management is the ability
to trade or lease allocation. This allows sector members
flexibility to acquire a portfolio of stocks that best
represents their fishing businesses. Members may trade
or lease their allocation among themselves or with
members of other sectors. Sometimes fishermen make
these arrangements themselves and sometimes they
may ask their sector manager to do it for them. All trades
outside the sector go through the sector manager and
are reported to NMFS, which approves the trade if the
sectors have enough allocation to cover the deal. Trades
that happen within a sector are not reported to NMFS
until the sectors’ year-end report.
4 The exception to this history is to the Fixed Gear Sector,
whose history for GB cod was originally set from 1991-2001 in
Amendment 13 and was upheld in Amendment 16.
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others who decide not to fish for groundfish, leasing
out their entire allocation instead.

The sector manager
Each sector employs a full- or part-time sector
manager. Some managers work for more than
one sector. The sector manager’s job varies from
sector to sector, but has three basic components:
tracking and reporting the sector’s landings,
discards, and trades on a weekly basis; keeping
track of the internal division of allocation and
catch; and overseeing the trade of allocation with
other sectors. Some managers take on additional
duties, such as overseeing the sector’s finances.
Some sectors have subcontracted the tracking
and reporting task to a third party. In all cases
the sector manager is hired by and reports to the
sector’s board of directors.

Catch accounting and reporting
A sector must demonstrate to NMFS that it is
staying within its allocation for all stocks. Each
week, sector managers file a report to NMFS
that shows the beginning allocation available,
what was landed, what was discarded, and what
was traded in or out of the sector (see Figure
2). Sector managers rely on two sources of
data to determine what their members landed:
mandatory weekly reports from seafood dealers
that provide total landed weight by species and
the vessel trip reports that document where the
fish were caught to differentiate between stock
areas (for example, Gulf of Maine cod versus
Georges Bank cod) and the type of gear used.
Discarded fish, those below the legal size of a
species, must then be subtracted from the landed
amounts because those fish count against a
sector’s allocation5. NMFS provides discard data
derived from on-board observers and monitors.
NMFS also calculates an assumed discard rate
that applies to trips that do not carry an on-board
monitor. Finally, managers account for any fish
traded in or out of the sector over the past week.

Figure 2. Weekly Allocation Accounting

Monitoring
In Amendment 16, the Council envisioned
two types of monitoring—dockside and atsea. Dockside monitoring was designed to
verify the dealer reports (and therefore landed
catch) with a third-party monitor witnessing a
vessel’s off-load to ensure weights and species
were accurately recorded. At-sea monitoring
produces discard rates and verifies catch and
area fished. Amendment 16 stipulates that
industry assume the costs of monitoring, but
NMFS provided grants to cover sectors’ dockside
monitoring expenses during the start-up phase
of the new sector system. NMFS suspended
dockside monitoring in mid-September, 2011
after deciding it was not a good use of funds.
In addition, NMFS has run and funded atsea monitoring through its observer program,
pledging to continue funding at-sea monitoring
through April, 2013.
When federal support for monitoring is no longer
available, the industry will face a substantial new
cost. Dockside monitoring costs were inversely
proportional to the size of a vessel’s offload—
costs ranged from about a half cent per pound
for the largest landings to close to two cents per
pound for smaller ones. Some very small trips
landed in remote ports were even costlier. Unless
the Council adjusts Amendment 16, dockside
monitoring will resume in 2013 at 20% coverage
of vessel arrivals.
At-sea monitoring is much more expensive,
ranging from $550 to $700 a day. NMFS has
aimed to cover 38% of groundfish trips with an
observer or monitor in 2010 and 2011 and is

5 Under sector management, vessels must bring all legally sized fish to the dock.
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lowering its target to 25% for 2012. Even at that
level, many vessels will be hard pressed to absorb
this additional cost. Since discard rates vary by
sector, gear type, and fishing grounds, monitors
must be deployed to ensure adequate coverage
levels for each combination within a sector to
attain a Council-mandated level of statistical
confidence. NMFS remains committed to its
observing program, which covers 8% of trips to
collect scientific data. Industry will be responsible
for the remaining 17% coverage.

its allocation and avoid being shut down by
reaching its limit on a constraining stock. In
response, captains starting using nets with larger
mesh to let out undersized fish. Meanwhile,
more vessels developed and utilized nets that
avoid constraining stocks. For example, the low
allocations of cod lead more boats to use the
“separator trawl” that targets haddock while
avoiding cod or the “topless trawl” that yields
more flounder than cod.

4. How industry has
responded

Worried that a single tow might yield more of a
stock than they have allocation to cover, some
fishermen started using catch sensors that clip to
the codend (the tail end of a trawl net where the
fish collect) and signal the wheelhouse when the
catch reaches a pre-set weight of fish. Similarly,
many skippers are making much shorter tows to
keep a closer eye on the amount of fish coming
over the rail.

In April of 2011, the Gulf of Maine Research
Institute (GMRI) conducted a survey of groundfish
permit holders to gain a better understanding
of how fishermen have adjusted to sector
management6. The survey revealed a wide range
of changes. The most publicized of which was
the number of fishermen who dropped out either
permanently (by selling their permit and vessel) or
temporarily (by leasing out all of their allocation)
because they felt their portion of the sector’s annual
allocation was not enough to remain profitable (see
the graph on page 10 showing the decline in active
groundfish vessels over the past decade).
Focusing exclusively on fleet consolidation misses
the profound changes that took place among the
majority of vessels that remained active. Indeed,
fishermen have adapted to sector management
with wholesale changes throughout their entire
operations, from the number of trips they make to
the influence they wield in the marketplace.

More selective gear
Sector management puts an added premium
on targeting legally sized fish since undersized
fish count against the sector’s allocation but
cannot be sold. Additionally, employing selective
fishing gear may allow a vessel to optimize
6 Full survey results available on GMRI website at http://www.gmri.org/
community/fisheries.asp.

Weight-watching

Managing allocation
Although most sectors treated their collective
allocation as individual quotas, some sectors
blurred the lines by swapping allocation around
to suit each fisherman’s business. Thus, two
fishermen might simply trade stocks so that
each ends up with a mix of species they had
traditionally targeted, regardless of whether one
stock is worth more at the dock than the other. In
cases where difference in market value is extreme,
some money might change hands as well.
Most fishermen lease and trade allocation to
keep fishing. The lease price for allocation
tends to follow market price and reflect the
relative abundance of that stock. Therefore cod,
which has a high dock price as well as being
a constraining stock for many vessels, is quite
expensive—meaning its leasing price is close to
the dock price for landed fish. Other stocks (e.g.
pollock) that are more abundant and fetch lower
prices at the dock are significantly cheaper to
lease. Some owners may decide that it is worth
buying constraining stocks at a relatively high
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price if it means they can harvest more of their
allocation of other, more abundant fish. The
financial decisions under sector management
have become more complicated.
Most fishermen report that leasing allocation
under sector management is relatively more
expensive than leasing days-at-sea was under
the old system. The exception is owners of large
vessels. Large vessels (over 75 feet) were limited
to a small pool of days-at-sea that matched their
vessel’s length and horsepower. Under the daysat-sea system, smaller vessels could buy days
from larger ones, but not the other way around.
The reasoning was that a large vessel could land
more fish per day than a smaller one. Under
sector management, it no longer matters what
size vessel is landing fish, so allocation can be
traded among all vessel sizes, and gear types,
expanding the pool of available allocation for the
largest boats.

Marketing contracts
Traditionally, groundfish landed in New England
passes through auction houses or other dealers
with prices varying daily, driven largely by the
amount of a given species landed that day. Under
sectors, however, fishermen have greater control
over their supply of fish because they hold a
pre-defined portion of the overall harvest. Some
fishermen have responded by entering into
forward contracts with processors or retailers to
supply a given amount of fish for a certain price,
adding stability for both sides.
Fishermen need to be careful, however, not to run
afoul of anti-trust laws, which may come into play
if two or more enter a contract together. GMRI
and the Northeast Sector Services Network hired
a legal team to draft a white paper as guidance for
sectors. That paper is available on GMRI’s website
at www.gmri.org/sectorresources.
Processors—companies that purchase fish from
dealers or auctions and prepare them for market—
have changed their business models to adapt to
the new system. Many are seeking contracts with
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harvesters to generate more predictable supplies.
Large chain restaurants, cruise ship companies,
and multi-state retailers comprise the bulk of
the seafood market. They want a steady supply
so they can streamline their menus or advertise
specials well in advance. Processors often take
huge risks when negotiating such deals, having
to fulfill orders by purchasing fish on the global
marketplace. Negotiating contracts directly with
harvesters can help reduce those risks, allowing
them to pay more at the dock. Some processors
want to reduce their risk further by switching to a
contract-production model. Under that system, a
processor would not own the fish they prepare for
market. Instead, a retailer would purchase directly
from a harvester, dealer, or auction and either the
buyer or seller would contract the processor to
process the fish.

Lawsuits
The groundfish industry has not responded solely
with modifications to its businesses. Fishermen
and fishing communities have banded together
to challenge core components of Amendment 16
in the courts. Citing possible conflicts with the
National Standards7, the suit seeks to overturn
Amendment 16. The plaintiffs claim a gross
injustice in how catch history was determined for
the initial allocation. Specifically, the catch period
for one sector was slightly different for one stock
and the recreational catch was determined using
a different time period than for the commercial
fleet. In July of 2011, the court upheld the sector
system; however a promised appeal will keep the
issue in the courts for some time to come.

5. How NOAA Fisheries has
responded
Amendment 16’s monumental change did not affect
just the fishing industry. It brought commensurate
change to the regulatory process as well.
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Data management systems
NMFS staff from both the Northeast Regional
Office in Gloucester and the Northeast Fishery
Science Center in Woods Hole hosted a string of
workshops before Amendment 16 took effect. These
sessions were designed to gather industry input into
how data should flow and to ensure that sectors
develop data systems that met federal reporting
requirements, such as the weekly sector reports.
NMFS also facilitated sector reporting by
establishing a new website called the Sector
Information Management Module that provides
sectors with the dealer reports and discard data
they need to submit their weekly reports. Sector
managers use the website to submit their reports
and post allocation trade requests, which NMFS
must then approve based on the availability of
allocation from the supplying sector.

Discard estimation
When a vessel has an observer or monitor on
board, that trip gets assigned an actual discard
rate. But the majority of trips are not observed
or monitored, so NMFS assigns assumed discard
rates derived from trips that have been observed.
These sector-level assumed rates reflect the
vessel’s sector, gear type, and fishing location.
For example, all vessels in a given sector that fish
with gillnets in the southern New England area
get the same discard rate.

Financial support for dockside
monitoring and sector operations
Responding to concerns from industry that the
transition to sector management would be costly,
NMFS has made millions of dollars available
for sectors. Some of these funds came from two
pass-through grants made to GMRI as a costeffective way to disburse federal support quickly.
A total of $1.8 million was made available to
cover dockside monitoring costs. Working with
7 The Magnuson Act lays out 8 National Standards that should guide the
development of FMPs. The standards can be found here: http://www.nmfs.noaa.
gov/sfa/domes_fish/national_standard.htm.
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industry, GMRI developed a system for equitably
distributing monitoring funds, accounting for
the diverse range of sectors, landing ports, and
amount of allocation. NMFS committed a further
$1 million for sector start-up costs. When it
suspended funding for dockside monitoring,
NMFS redirected the roughly $1 million of
unspent funds to sector operational costs. Funds
for sector operations were distributed evenly
among all sectors, recognizing that all sectors face
similar fixed costs.

Collaborative research
In 2010, NMFS directed most of the region’s
collaborative research funding towards projects
that would help industry adjust to sectors.
One such project is GEARNET, a network of
fishermen and scientists. The project solicited
ideas from each sector and the common pool,
funding 17 in all. As a result, these fishermen
are testing new nets, catch sensors, and mammal
deterrents. More information about GEARNET
can be found at www.gearnet.org.

6. How nonprofits and
philanthropies responded
Technical assistance
Nonprofits and industry associations throughout
the region, including Cape Cod Commercial
Hook Fishermen’s Association, Penobscot
East Resource Center, the Island Institute,
EarthJustice, the Associated Fisheries of Maine,
the Northeast Seafood Coalition, and GMRI
moved to provide technical support to the
groundfish industry during the transition to
sectors. The sheer complexity of forming a sector
necessitated outside assistance. Given all the
demands on their time and resources, a small
group of fishermen would have been hard pressed
to prepare the hundreds of pages of documents,
including a highly technical environmental
assessment, needed to gain NMFS approval.
Environmental Defense Fund also worked
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to bring successful models to New England
from outside the region. These efforts gained
the support of several major foundations that
wanted New England’s sector model to succeed.

by-catch avoidance, fuel conservation, and fish
handling techniques.

Permit Banks

With its market-based approach to environmental
issues, Environmental Defense Fund has been a
proponent of catch shares and continues to search
for ways that industry can improve profitability
under sector management. To that end, they
sponsored a workshop in February, 2011, that
brought fishermen, processors, and retailers
together to explore new marketing opportunities.
With fishermen holding an allocation of fish, they
can treat that allocation as an inventory from which
to draw over the course of the year. Likewise,
processors and retailers have a better sense of
what supply might be available and can structure
contracts or promotions based on that information.

Other nonprofits, notably the Cape Cod Fisheries
Trust, the Gloucester Fishing Community
Preservation Fund, and The Nature Conservancy,
support the industry with permit banks (though
Cape Cod’s and Gloucester’s pre-date sector
management). Each permit bank has a different
emphasis, but they all offer fishing businesses
a way to augment their allocation with belowmarket leases. The Nature Conservancy has used
its permits to support conservation engineering
research to test more selective and fuel efficient
gear. Permit banks also exist to support fishermen
in Boston and on Boston’s South Shore—these,
too, pre-date sectors.

Marketing

Lawsuits

Congress directed roughly $5 million to Maine,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire to establish
permit banks. Through a memorandum of
understanding with NMFS, the state permit banks
focus on making allocation available to smaller
vessels (45 feet or less) from small communities.
Maine, which received a total of $3 million for
its permit bank, has established its own leaseonly sector. New Hampshire is planning to put its
permits in with the two sectors based in that state.
Massachusetts has opted to create a revolving loan
fund rather than a permit bank to assist fishermen
to buy new gear or lease allocation.

Several industry-based nonprofits joined the
lawsuit challenging Amendment 16 for being
too restrictive on industry. Another nonprofit,
Oceana, brought a lawsuit against NOAA arguing
that the amendment did not go far enough to
account for the new system’s impact on some
marine mammals, by-catch, discards, and highly
vulnerable stocks. At the end of 2011, the District
of Columbia Federal District Court ruled largely
in favor of NOAA, but agreed with Oceana
that the Amendment did not create suitable
accountability measures for five severely depleted
stocks8.

Research

7. Limits to adaptation

In addition to the GEARNET projects, research
institutions in the region, including the
University of Massachusetts School of Marine
Science and Technology, the University of
New Hampshire Cooperative Extension, the
Commercial Fisheries Research Foundation in
Rhode Island, and GMRI have focused research
projects on sector needs. This work includes
economic and social analysis, gear development,

Although industry, NMFS, and nonprofits
are quickly adapting to the new system with
innovation and ingenuity, there are limits to the
speed and depth of adaption. One constraint is
the sheer enormity of the change. Fishermen
have had to adapt to so many new regulatory
requirements that many have not been able to
make additional adjustments that could provide
added benefits, such as forward contracts.
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Another constraint is the availability of capital–
change is expensive and making investments in
new gear or additional allocation is beyond the
means of many vessel owners.
More than ever, fishermen must be shrewd
entrepreneurs, not just successful harvesters.
Sector management adds a new dimension to
their businesses—managing allocation—and
new demands for investment—purchasing
additional allocation and/or more selective gear,
all against the backdrop of increasing vessel safety
regulations and an aging fleet of vessels. Many
fishermen also serve on their sector’s boards.
As a result, they are spending increasing time
in meetings working through the business of
running sectors and learning the ins and outs of
nonprofit management.
The stock-specific relationship between
investment and return forms the underpinning of
the market incentives that drive this new system.
Through the basic laws of supply and demand,
this market-based approach makes it relatively
more expensive to harvest stocks with low catch
limits than stocks with higher limits. The effect
should be to push fishing effort to more abundant
stocks. However, that effect is somewhat
dampened by price increases for scarce but
desirable products and by constraints to changing
fishing practices. The seafood market is global
in scope, so a relative scarcity in New England
does not necessarily yield a higher price, which
would help offset lower catches. The global
nature of fisheries also means that New England
fishermen risk loosing market share permanently
if wholesalers can find a more predictable source
elsewhere, such as Norwegian haddock.
The increased costs associated with transitioning
to sectors hit industry at the same time that
catch limits were decreasing on many key stocks,
as mandated by tight rebuilding periods in the

8 Atlantic wolfish, ocean pout, Southern New England/Mid-Atlantic Winter
flounder, Southern and Northern windowpane flounder, and Halibut.
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Magnuson-Stevens Act. Between 2009 and 2010,
catch targets on 12 groundfish stocks declined,
some by as much as half. For example, the 2010
catch limit for Gulf of Maine cod, a key stock
for many smaller boats, was 60% less than the
2009 catch target. (Under days-at sea, the overall
limit was called a catch target while under sector
management, it is called a catch limit). As a
result, many vessels saw their revenue decline
from 2009 to 2010. The decrease was partly offset
by higher market prices, but not entirely.
A major obstacle for many boats was the effect of
the allocation formula used to distribute the catch
limits among sectors. Some fishermen found
themselves with low initial allocations, forcing
them either to lease in more allocation, lease
theirs out and concentrate on other fisheries, or
sell their permit and leave the fishery all together.
It is impossible to tell what spurred individual
decisions, as the fleet was already contracting
under days-at-sea, but Figure 3 shows NMFS data
on the number of vessels undertaking at least one
groundfish trip.
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Figure 3. Number of Active Groundfish Vessels, 2001 to 2011.

8. Areas ripe for innovation
Managing a sector
Currently, most sectors follow the same model:
a full- or part-time sector manager conducts
the bulk of the sector’s business - tracking
catch, executing trades, reporting to NMFS, and
interacting with the board of directors. Federal
assistance, over $3 million in total, has been
crucial for this initial start-up phase. But as that
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assistance fades out, sectors will need to develop
lower cost models for managing their businesses.
The New England Sector Services Network, an
off-shoot of the Northeast Seafood Coalition,
offers one model for centralizing certain sector
tasks, such as the annual application process, and
frees up sector managers to focus on marketing
or optimizing allocation. Another model is for
sectors to share or subcontract the intricate
catch reporting tasks. Additionally, sectors will
have to take a close look at the seasonality of
their groundfish activity and the premium they
might be paying for keeping their membership
small. Some sectors may either have to merge or
concentrate their fishing activity to a few months
to limit their need for a manager.

Sector composition
Because many sectors formed initially along
geographic and social lines, they were not
necessarily developed with an eye toward the mix
of allocation that their members might bring, nor
their fishing philosophy or marketing aspirations.
Some harvesters may find benefit from forming
sectors to create a specific mix of allocation, join
with others using selective gear so they reduce
their discard rate, or align along sustainable
marketing strategies.

Cost and effectiveness
of monitoring
Monitoring sectors potentially involves both
dockside and at-sea monitors to verify the
now-critical catch, discards, and stock data.
New monitoring requirements place additional
demands on industry’s financial resources, as well
as introducing safety and logistical concerns. The
traditional approach to at-sea monitoring that
relies on a human observer will be too expensive
for many fishing businesses once federal funding
ceases. New approaches, such as using video
cameras, hold promise but still face cost and
logistical hurdles.
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Size and composition of the fleet
The introduction of sector management has reignited
debate within industry about how many boats should be
fishing and what is the right balance between smaller,
in-shore vessels and larger, off-shore vessels. The many
changes highlighted thus far have dramatically changed
the commercial groundfish landscape. The result will
certainly be a restructuring of the fleet. Amendment 16
places no cap on permit or allocation ownership, either
by an individual or a sector. Attempts to add those to the
fishery management plan are ongoing, but very difficult
to institute.
Short of a major overhaul of the permitting system, market
forces will ultimately shape the size and composition
of the fleet. Smaller vessels, with lower margins, might
find new, more localized markets to get a premium
for their fish, much like local farmers throughout New
England. An added undercurrent is the gradual aging
of the fleet. Many of the vessels operating today date
to the 1970s. Replacing those vessels is expensive –
particularly because new Coast Guard regulations have
improved safety but added cost. As fishermen upgrade
their vessels, they will face six- and seven-figure prices
for new boats. Financing capacity and risk tolerance will
likely reshape the fleet toward consolidation and more
business-focused management.

Higher yields of annual catch limits
Despite the economic hardship faced by many
during the first year of sector management,
the fleet as a whole did not catch more than
85% of any allocated stock. While some sectors
did harvest 100% of a few of their allocations,
industry will be looking to increase their harvest
levels as much as possible. Part of the solution
to increasing yields may be to reconsider closed
areas; many fishermen contend that closed
areas constrain their ability to stay on schools
of haddock or pollock. Increased use of more
selective gear, bait, and fishing practices may also
help sectors harvest more of their allocations.
Finally, sector members may find benefit from
planning their activities around their sector’s total
allocation rather than treating each member’s
allocation as an individual quota.
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Price stabilization
The change to sector management has the
potential to bring significant change to the way
catch is sold and, therefore, the price fishermen
receive. Fishing against an annual allocation
allows the fishermen more control over their
effort and the ability to time their activity to
general market trends. In addition, sectors
introduce the opportunity for vessels to contract
more directly with retailers by entering into
longer-term contracts for a certain amount of fish
for a set price. In a world ruled by uncertainty,
the thought of a more stable price holds great
appeal for many fishermen, just as a more stable
supply, even at a premium, holds appeal to
supermarkets and restaurants.
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Sustainability and the Marketplace
Holding allocation at the vessel or sector level creates new
opportunities for fishermen to distinguish themselves
in the marketplace. One of the tenets of quota-based
fishery management is that it grants participating vessels
a greater sense of ownership over their portion of the
overall catch. Fishermen have always been stewards of
the resource, but if that resource is held in common, the
actions of individual fishermen get lost in the collective
activity of the entire fleet. Having a set amount of fish to
harvest - with the possibility of purchasing more - creates
a system more analogous to manufacturers holding an
inventory of product. Investments made in gear that
reduces its impact on habitat or requires less fuel not
only reduce operating costs, but also yield higher prices
by responding to the increased market demand for
sustainably sourced food.

Traceability
While not directly linked to sectors or catch
shares, the ability to trace a seafood product from
its point of harvest through processing to the
retailer can strengthen the connection between
harvester and consumer. With the increased
interest in local, sustainable foods, demonstrating
those connections is critical for reassuring the
public about the authenticity of its seafood.
Traceability can mean several things, but at its
core, it is the ability to trace the origin of a product
through the various transactions that bring it
from its source (in this case, a fishing vessel) to
its consumer. Seafood typically changes hands
multiple times as it gets landed, auctioned off,
transported to a processor, processed into fillets
or other products, sold to a distributor, and finally
conveyed to a retail venue such as a grocery store
or restaurant. Steps along the way may be skipped
if, for example, chefs buy directly from a vessel
or fish are sold through a community-supported
fishery. Regardless of the number of steps, tracing
a product’s origin back to a specific vessel (or
even specific fishing ground) adds value—and
accountability—especially if it also allows a retailer
to tell a story about that origin.

Assessment science
The 2006 reauthorization of the MagnusonStevens Act draws a clear distinction around
using the best available science to set catch
limits. Councils may not set catch limits above
fishing levels set by their Science and Statistical
Committees. In addition, the switch to an outputbased management system places a new emphasis
on assessment science. Not only are absolute
numbers of each stock important, but their
abundance relative to each other becomes critical.
Assessments for the majority of stocks might be
accurate, but if the assessment for a constraining
stock is too low, it impacts industry’s ability to
harvest all other stocks as well.
The need to create stock-by-stock catch limits
that are tied to strict accountability measures has
pushed the limits of current assessment science.
The current cycle of assessments every three
years may not be frequent enough to capture
changes in the ecosystem and our understanding
of population structure may not be refined
enough to explain changes in abundance and
geographic distributions. Gulf of Maine cod and
Georges Bank yellowtail flounder serve as two
examples of stocks whose recent assessments
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differed dramatically from estimates made just
three years ago.
The planned move to an ecosystem-based
approach to managing fisheries will place even
more demands on the scientific community.
Managing the fishery at the ecosystem level
rather than the stock level will likely require
aggregating stocks into larger family groups
(such as all gadids—cod, pollock, and haddock)
and unifying the broad management areas to
include all stocks (currently, different stocks
are managed with different stock boundaries).
The increased complexity of understanding
and accounting for interactions across stocks
will present a huge challenge for scientists.
Translating that complexity into an equitable and
efficient management system will prove equally
challenging for managers.

9. Conclusion
Sector management has changed the legal,
economic, and cultural landscape for New
England’s groundfish industry, resulting in
monumental changes to historical fishing
practices and a way of life. The fishing industry
has responded with everything from tinkering
with their fishing gear to complex marketing
agreements that help stabilize price to lawsuits
seeking to halt sector management altogether.
As sectors take hold acute challenge are
emerging: uncertainty in stock assessments,
data management constraints, monitoring costs,
and the increasing need for capital to compete
effectively. Overcoming those challenges will
require individual and collective innovations of all
stripes—technical, social, economic, and political.
Much innovation has occurred already. But many
questions remain:
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• how does industry survive the impending
era of drastically reduced catch limits on
key stocks such as the 22% drop in Gulf
of Maine cod for 2012 (and a much larger
drop anticipated for 2013)?
• can assessment science improve to provide
more timely and accurate catch limits?
• how do smaller vessels with limited access
to capital compete in a system that requires
higher investments?
• can the cooperative nature of sectors allow
their members to capitalize on a shared
allocation to grow profitability?
• can the system both reward innovative
owners who invest wisely while
maintaining opportunity for new businesses
or isolated communities? and
• what lies ahead as the nation moves
toward management systems that reflect
the complex interactions of the marine
ecosystem rather than treating individual
stocks in isolation?
The answers to these questions lie along a spectrum
of individual entrepreneurship through democratic
political engagement in the Council process. Sector
management now defines the arena in which these
questions will be answered for the groundfish
fishery. As industry members, managers, scientists,
and the public grapple with the dramatic changes
the new system has created, they will need to work
together to overcome remaining obstacles to success
while capitalizing on the opportunities that sector
management offers.

